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Io ﬀer an interpretation of the macroeconomic events in the great recession of 2008-2009, and
the subsequent outlook, focused on the ﬁscal stance of the U. S. government and its link to
potential inﬂation. What happened? How did policies work? Are we headed for inﬂation or
deﬂation? Will the Fed be able to follow an “exit strategy?” Will large government deﬁcits
lead to inﬂation? If so, what will that event look like?
I base the analysis on two equilibrium conditions, some form of which hold in almost
every model of money and inﬂation: the valuation equation for nominal government debt








(+ − +) (1)
 (·)= (2)
where  is money,  is debt, Λ is a stochastic discount factor,  is tax revenue including
seigniorage, and  is government spending. Sargent and Wallace (1981) (also Sargent 1992)
used these two equations to analyze disinﬂation in the 1980s. I follow a similar path.
Monetary economists studying the postwar U.S. typically do not pay much attention to
ﬁscal issues, feeling with some justiﬁcation that ﬁscal issues are not a serious constraint to
monetary policy. But these are new times, with massive ﬁscal deﬁcits, credit guarantees,
and Federal Reserve purchases of risky private assets. At some point (rises in ,d e c l i n e si n
 −) ﬁscal constraints must take hold. There is a limit to how much taxes a government
can raise, a top of a Laﬀer curve, a ﬁscal limit to monetary policy. At that point, inﬂation
must result, no matter how valiantly the central bank attempts to split government liabilities
between money and bonds. Long before that point, the government may choose to inﬂate
rather than further raise distorting taxes or reduce politically important spending. Argentina
has found these ﬁscal limits. So far, the U. S. has not, at least recently. But unfamiliarity
does not mean impossibility, the future may be diﬀerent from the recent past, and ﬁscal
constraints may change how monetary policy and inﬂation work.
After a quick review of the theory underlying the ﬁscal equation, I analyze the current
situation, common forecasts, and policy debates. I make the following points:
1. Why did a ﬁnancial crisis lead to such a big recession? We understand how a surge in
money demand, if not accommodated by the Fed, can lead to a decline in output. I
argue that we saw something similar — a “ﬂight to quality,” a surge in the demand for all
government debt and away from goods, services and private debt. In the ﬁscal context
of (1), this event corresponds to a decrease in the discount rate for government debt.
Many of the Government’s policies can be understood as ways to accommodate this
demand, which a conventional swap of money for government debt does not address.
This story is in contrast to “lending channel” or “ﬁnancial frictions” stories for the
recession, essentially falls in aggregate supply.
2. Winter 2009 saw the announcement of dramatic ﬁscal stimulus programs in the U. S., U.
K., and many other countries, along with academic controversy over their eﬀectiveness.
2(a) Will “ﬁscal stimulus” stimulate? In this analysis, deﬁcits “stimulate” if and only
if people do not expect future taxes to pay oﬀ the increased debt. Unlike conven-
tional “Ricardian equivalence,” we do not need irrationality or market failure for
this expectation, since our government debt is nominal.
(b) Much stimulus debate revolves around the fact that ﬁscal expenditures cannot
happen quickly. In this analysis, prospective deﬁcits are just as “stimulative” as
current deﬁcits.
3. With interest rates near zero, monetary policy turned to quantitative easing: large
additional purchases of government debt. I show that quantitative easing cannot inﬂate
without ﬁscal cooperation. If the government wants inﬂationary stimulus, it must
somehow convince people that the government will not raise taxes or cut spending to
pay oﬀ deﬁcits. If people expect extra money to be soaked up by later taxes, they are
happy simply to hold it.
4 .Ie x a m i n et h em e c h a n i s m sa n ds c e n a r i o st h a tc o u l db r i n gu si n ﬂation.
(a) Can the Fed undo the massive money expansion with open market purchases, or
will it be hard to sell trillions of additional Treasury bills? The ﬁscal analysis does
not suggest substantial impediments. If quantitative easing makes little diﬀerence
on the way up, it is easy to reverse on the way down. If inﬂation comes, then, it
is more likely to result from the ﬁscal mechanism.
(b) What will a ﬁscal inﬂation look like? I extend the simple ﬁscal equation (1) to long-
term debt, and I analyze a stylized shock to expected surpluses. In a plausible
scenario, long-term interest rates rise with the shock, but inﬂation only comes
slowly after a few years.
(c) Credit guarantees and nominal commitments to government employees make mat-
ters worse than actual deﬁcits suggest. On the other hand, they imply that a
smaller inﬂation has a larger eﬀect on government ﬁnances.
(d) If taxes have any eﬀect on growth, the ‘Laﬀer limit’ of taxation may come much
sooner than static analysis suggests. The present value of taxes is strongly inﬂu-
enced by growth. The big inﬂation danger is a long period of slow growth.
(e) Many commentators argue that ﬁscal inﬂation is remote, since the US debt/GDP
ratio is still reasonable. Since prospective deﬁcits matter in (1), I point out that
debt/GDP ratios are not a good guide to ﬁscal safety.
5. Last, but perhaps most important: Will a ﬁscal inﬂation come with a boom or stagﬂa-
tion? I argue that the ﬁscal valuation equation acts as the “anchor” for monetary
policy, or the “expectation” that shifts the Phillips curve. A ﬁscal inﬂation is there-
fore likely to lead to the same stagﬂationary eﬀects as any loss of “anchoring.”
I focus on equations (1) and (2) because they are common to a wide array of fully
ﬂeshed-out models. It is also nice to see that we can begin to understand many events
in their relatively frictionless context. However, equations (1) and (2) are the beginning,
3not the end of analysis, and I do not mean to imply otherwise. In particular, monetary
models also include a description of dynamics, and price-stickiness or other mechanism that
sometimes translates inﬂation into real output, which I only touch on at the end of this essay.
Additional frictions, to consider stimulative eﬀects of tax or real debt-ﬁnanced government
spending, and additional ﬁnancial frictions can easily be added to this style of analysis.
2F i s c a l r e v i e w
2.1 The government debt valuation equation
The government debt valuation equation1 states that the real value of nominal government
debt must equal the present value of future primary surpluses. In the simplest case that the














where  is money,  is government debt, Λ+Λ is the real stochastic discount factor
between periods  and  + ,  is the nominal interest rate and  =  −  denotes real
primary surpluses. The web appendix (Cochrane 2010) derives this and related equations.
In particular, it explains that we can also discount at the ex-post real rate of return on gov-
ernment debt, i.e. we may substitute 1+ for Λ+Λ, which is useful for thinking about
discount-rate eﬀects more concretely. Seigniorage  is small for the U. S. economy,
and I will ignore it in most application and discussion.
The description of price-level determination in (3) is not unusual or counterintuitive. If,
at the current price level, the real value of government debt is greater than expected future
surpluses, people try to get rid of that debt and purchase private assets and goods and
s e r v i c e si n s t e a d .T h i si s“ a g g r e g a t ed e m a n d ”o ra“ w e a l t he ﬀect of government debt.”
Our most pressing question is, how might debt and deﬁcits translate into inﬂation?
Equation (3) gives an unusual answer and a warning: Expected future deﬁcits + cause
inﬂation today.I n ﬂation need not wait for large deﬁcits to materialize, for large debt to GDP
ratios to occur, for monetization of debt or for explicit seigniorage. As soon as people ﬁgure
o u tt h a tt h e r ew i l lb ei n ﬂation in the future, they try to get rid of money and government
debt now.
More speciﬁcally, the ﬂow version of (3) says that the government prints money to redeem
maturing debt, and then soaks up that money with current surpluses and by issuing new
debt. If expected future surpluses decline, then people forecast future inﬂation, when those
deﬁcits really are directly monetized. Nominal interest rates rise, and hence the government
raises less revenue from today’s debt sales. Now, the new money used to redeem maturing
debt today is no longer all soaked up by current surpluses or new debt sales. (Selling more
debt today won’t help, because that requires raising promised future surpluses.) Instead,
1Many of the points in this section are treated at more length in Cochrane (1998), (2001), (2005). These
papers also contain bibliographic reviews, which more properly attribute credit for the ideas.
4that money must chase goods and services. In this way, diﬃculties in rolling over short-term
debt in the face of higher interest rates are one of the ﬁrst signs of a ﬁscal inﬂation driven
by expected future deﬁcits, and a central mechanism by which future deﬁcits induce current
inﬂation. A rise in the discount rate or risk premium for government debt can have the
same inﬂationary impact as bad news about future surpluses.
One might well ask, “What surpluses?” as the U.S. has reported continual deﬁcits for a
long time. However, equation (3) refers to primary surpluses, i.e. net of interest expense.
Figure 1 presents a simple estimate of the primary surplus, taken from the NIPA accounts,
and expressed as a percentage of GDP. In fact, positive primary surpluses are not rare.
From the end of the second world war until the early 1970s, the US typically ran primary
surpluses, and paid oﬀ much of the WWII debt in that way. 1973 and especially 1975
were years of really bad primary deﬁcits, on the tail of a downward trend, and suggestively
coinciding with the outbreak of inﬂation. The “Reagan deﬁcits” of the early 1980s don’t
show up much, especially controlling for the natural business cycle correlation, because much
of those deﬁcits consisted of very high interest payments on a stock of outstanding debt. The
return to surpluses in the late 80s and the strong surpluses of the 1990s are familiar, and
suggestively correlated with the end of inﬂation. Our current situation resembles a cliﬀ,
motivating some of the concerns of this paper.
Though suggestive, the association of primary surpluses with the emergence and end of
inﬂation in Figure 1 requires a subtle analysis. Equation (3) holds in every macroeconomic
model, both ex-ante and ex-post, so success in such matching is in some sense guaranteed,
especially once one takes into account the rate of return on government debt. In any worked-
out model, current surpluses are a bad indicator of the present value of future surpluses, as
governments raise debt (run deﬁcits) by credibly promising higher future surpluses.

















Figure 1: Real primary surplus/GDP. Primary surplus is current receipts - current expendi-
tures + interests expense, deﬂated with the GDP deﬂator. Source: NIPA.
52.2 Monetary and ﬁscal policy
To capture the idea that monetary policy can aﬀect the price level by the split of government
liabilities between money and debt, we also need a money demand function, that captures







The notation (·) reminds us that many variables can aﬀect velocity as well as interest
rates; “precautionary” or “ﬂight to quality” shifts in money demand. I include  because
money demand theories typically predict that inside money  (checking deposits) matter
as well as the monetary base, direct government liabilities .
Equations (3) and (4) each involve the price level. Thus, government must arrive at a
“coordinated policy” by which monetary and ﬁscal policy agree on that price level, a choice
of {  } (and controls on ; or equivalent interest-rate policy) such that both (3)
and (4) hold. Successful monetary policy needs an appropriate ﬁscal backing; successful
ﬁscal expansion needs monetary cooperation.
Conventional treatments of monetary policy specify that the taxing authorities will always
adjust surpluses + ex-post to validate any price level chosen by monetary authorities
through (4), thus assuming away any force for (3). We’re here to think about what happens
when (3) exerts more force on the price level. This may happen when debt, deﬁcits and
distorting taxes become large, or by choice, when monetary regimes become passive.
The government debt valuation equation (3) inﬂuences the price level in some unusual
ways, that contrast with many classic monetary doctrines. First, except for the small
seigniorage term (), there is no diﬀerence between money and bonds in (3), so open
market operations have no eﬀects on the price level. Second, only government money and
debt matter for the price level. People can generate arbitrary inside claims  with no
inﬂationary pressure, and the government need not control such claims — ban banknotes,
require reserves, etc. — in order to control the price level. In fact, the price level can remain
determined even at the frictionless limit, say with all transactions mediated by debit cards
on interest-paying funds,  =0 , or with money that pays market interest. Third, the
government can follow a real-bills doctrine: If the government issues money  or debt 
in exchange for assets of equal value, which can retire that debt in time, no inﬂation results.
The price level also remains determinate with an interest-rate peg, or other “passive money”
policies.
We do not have to specify how monetary-ﬁscal coordination is achieved. We do not
have to make a choice or diagnosis of “regime.” We need not argue what is “exogenous” or
“endogenous.” In particular, analyzing equation (3) does not require us to assume that sur-
pluses are “exogenous” in any sense. Surpluses are always a choice, though one that involves
distorting taxes and politically diﬃcult spending decisions. Studying events conditional on
such decisions does not assume that those decisions do not exist. We are never “choosing
which equation holds.” Both (3) and (4) hold in every equilibrium or regime. Our question
is, how? Even one thinks the Fed is in charge of the price level through (4), and Congress and
the Treasury pledge to respond with the appropriate surpluses in (3), it’s useful to examine
that implicit ﬁscal backing to see if it is vaguely plausible that it will or can be provided.
62.3 Sargent, Wallace, seigniorage and nominal debt
My analysis of (3) and (4) diﬀers from Sargent and Wallace’s (1982) and many other joint
ﬁscal-monetary analyses, in that I explicitly consider nominal government debt — debt is
only a promise to pay U.S. dollars.



























where  denotes the real amount of debt, which does not change if the price level changes.
Sargent and Wallace, examining (6), argued that looming + − + problems would
have to be met by seigniorage, ++. That money creation, through + (·)=
++ would create inﬂation at time +. Finally, that future inﬂation could be brought
back to the present time  by hyperinﬂation dynamics  [()] = .
With nominal debt, as in (5), inadequate future + − + can raise the current price
level  directly. This rise lowers the outstanding value of nominal government debt, reestab-
lishing equation (5). This channel is absent with real debt. (State-contingent debt or an
explicit default can also accomplish such a revaluation, but Sargent and Wallace sensibly
assumed that the U.S. government would inﬂate rather than explicitly default.)
Most commentators assume that inﬂation can only come after money creation, whether
induced by seigniorage needs or by policy mistakes. In fact, with nominal debt, not only can
inﬂation come before the seigniorage, as pointed out by Sargent and Wallace, it can come
without any current or past money creation2 at all,  =0in (5). A ﬁscal or “ﬂight from
the dollar” inﬂation can occur based directly on expectations of future ﬁscal trouble.
Nominal debt works like equity: its price can absorb shocks to expected future cashﬂows,
and its price reﬂects expectations of future events. Real debt works like debt, which must
be repaid or explicitly default. There is sense in the view that exchange rates and inﬂation
reﬂect “conﬁdence” in the government, output, productivity and ﬁscal prospects, all having
nothing to do with central banks’ arrangement of the maturity and liquidity structure of
government debt.
2Ac l a r i ﬁcation:  here refers to money, held despite an interest cost. In a frictionless model, inﬂation
still comes from “monetization,” in the sense that the government prints money to pay oﬀ debt, larger than is
soaked up by taxes and debt sales if the price level is too low. This extra money then puts upward pressure on
prices. In the frictionless limit, this happens instantaneously, and nobody holds any dominated-rate-of-return
debt overnight, so there is no seignorage.
72.4 Long term debt and inﬂation dynamics
Equation (3) describes the simple case of ﬂoating-rate or overnight debt. The dynamic
relationship between debt, surpluses and inﬂation can be quite diﬀerent with long-term
debt. These diﬀerences are important to understand, in order to apply these ideas to the U.
S. economy. In particular, they suggest that a ﬁscal inﬂation will not consist of price-level
jumps, and ﬁscal price determination does not mean that the price level must display the
volatility and unpredictability of stock prices. Instead, ﬁscal inﬂation will likely consist of a
smooth increase in inﬂation presaged by higher long-term interest rates.
As an extreme but simple example, suppose that debt consists of a single perpetuity:
A constant coupon  is redeemed each period, with no other debt purchases or sales and
no money. In this case, the price level is the ratio of the nominal coupon coming due each




In this case, inﬂation only happens when the actual poor surpluses + are realized, and not
in anticipation of those surpluses as in (3) or (5).























  denotes the market value of
nominal government debt, 
()








denotes the nominal price at  of -year debt. With long -term debt, the market value of
debt as well as the price level can absorb expected-surplus shocks. In the extreme perpetuity
example (7), bad news about a future surplus + raises only the future price level +.
Future inﬂation lowers bond prices 
()
 ,s ob o n dp r i c e si nt h en u m e r a t o ro f( 8 )d oall the
adjusting at  rather than time-t prices  in the dominator. In general, both eﬀects will
occur.
With long-term debt, the government can also trade current for future inﬂation, holding
ﬁxed the surplus stream, by selling additional long-term debt. This new debt dilutes the
claims of existing long-term debt, giving the government some resources to avoid current
inﬂation. However, by increasing the stock of long-term debt it makes the eventual inﬂation
worse. By contrast, with ﬂoating-rate or overnight debt, the government can still freely
choose the future price level {+}, with no change in surpluses, by changing +.C h a n g i n g
nominal debt without changing surpluses is the same thing as a currency reform. However,
this action does not aﬀect the current price level , as you can see in (3).
The maturity structure of outstanding long-term debt gives the “budget constraint” to
the government’s options for trading inﬂation today for inﬂation at future dates by such
8surplus-neutral debt sales and purchases. This statement is easiest to digest in the case of
















By buying and selling debt at date  and later, after + is revealed, the government
can achieve any sequence  (1+), consistent with this equation, without making any





 — the better the tradeoﬀ. (For a proof, see Cochrane 2001 p. 88).
2.5 An inﬂation scenario
How will inﬂation react to a negative shock in expected surpluses? This is our central
question. To answer this question, we have to measure the maturity structure of outstanding
debt, and take a stand on how the government will attempt to smooth inﬂation via debt
sales, as follows.
If the U.S. only had overnight or ﬂoating-rate debt, the answer would be simple: A
sudden change in expectations about the present value of future surpluses implies a jump
in the price level , by (3). The government can choose any path { (1+)} after that,
by appropriately choosing the path of nominal debt, and it might well choose no additional
inﬂation. However, long-term debt allows the government to avoid price-level jumps. Price-
level jumps are not desirable either, and that may be a good reason why our government
issues long-term debt.
Suppose that the economy starts at a steady-state price level , and there is a single
expected-surplus shock ∆ at date ,



















  = ∆

























denotes the fraction of the market value of debt due to maturity-j debt.
9Holding the path of surpluses constant, the government can still choose any path {+}
consistent with (10). With outstanding long-term debt 
()
  0,t h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nt r a d e
less inﬂation now  for more inﬂation later +. To display the response to a surplus shock,
then, we have to take a stance on which path the government will choose. Our government
seems to prefer steady inﬂation to highly variable inﬂation or price level jumps, and for good
reasons. To get a sense of the possibilities, I suppose the government holds inﬂation to zero
for T years, and then allows a constant inﬂation ,
+ = ; 
+ = 
(−);  ≥ 













II suppose a 10% negative shock to the present value of expected surpluses, ∆ = −10%.
I form an estimate of the maturity structure of outstanding debt 
()
 . Then, for each ,I
ﬁnd the value of  that solves equation (11).
To estimate the maturity structure 
()
 , I use every bond, bill, or note in the CRSP
mbx database on Jan 31, 2009. I assign coupons to the month in which they come due,
so 
()
 includes both principal and coupon payments coming due at time  + .T h i s i s a
very crude measure: I do not include Federal Reserve liabilities, nor oﬀsetting government or
Federal Reserve assets. I do not include credit guarantees, nor the nominal value of unused
depreciation allowances and other nominal commitments. I do not include nominally-sticky
salaries and pension or health beneﬁts of government workers. However, this is a useful
starting place. It lets us begin to think about how much of a long-term debt cushion the
U.S. government has, and thus how quickly surplus shocks must feed in to inﬂation.
Figure 2 plots three possibilities. First, I plot (red triangles) a one-time 11% price-level
jump. This is the solution with no long-term debt, and it remains available in the presence
of long-term debt; it is a solution of (10).
Next, I plot (blue circles) a steady 2.75% inﬂation starting immediately ( =0 ).
This is a much more plausible path. To arrange it, the government sells long-term debt to
meet the surplus shock. This inﬂation path soon brings about higher future price levels than
the one-time jump, which is how it still satisﬁes (10).
Finally, I plot (black triangles) a postponed inﬂation. Here, the government sells even
more long term debt immediately, so as to have no inﬂa t i o na ta l lf o rf o u ry e a r s .I nt h eﬁfth
year, it allows the necessary inﬂation to emerge. Since there isn’t that much long-term debt
outstanding at this maturity, the resulting inﬂation and cumulative price-level increases are
also much larger.
Again, the government can choose which one of these paths to follow, with no diﬀerence
in surpluses, by its long-term debt operations. Which one will our government choose?
Certainly not the price level jump. The delayed-inﬂation scenario seems plausible to me.
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Figure 2: Three possible reactions to a 10% expected surpluse shock ∆ =
( − −∆)
R ∞
=0 −+. Red triangles display a time-t price level jump followed by
no additional inﬂation. Blue circles display a steady inﬂation starting at time t Black tri-
angles display a steady inﬂation starting 4 years after the shock. The choices are calibrated
to an estimate of the US Federal debt maturity structure.
(Of course, one could try to estimate this behavior, or solve an optimal inﬂation-smoothing
exercise after adding some frictions, but either is a lengthy exercise.)
To further bring the postponed-inﬂation possibility to life, Figure 3 plots the correspond-
ing time series of inﬂation and bond yields. The vertical line indicates the date of the surplus
shock. First, long term bond yields rise. As the inﬂation approaches, shorter term rates rise
as well. Finally, 5 years after the surplus shock, the steady inﬂation actually materializes.
When you think of ﬁscal inﬂation, then, think at least of this possibility, not a price-level
jump. The “news” here is a collective decision by investors that the US is likely not to
solve its long-term deﬁcit problems, or a rise in the discount rate applied to U.S. debt. Such
“news” is seldom independently visible. Thus, we are likely ﬁr s tt os e eap u z z l i n gr i s ei nl o n g -
term interest rates. Shorter rates will follow, and steady inﬂation will follow that, on a on a
time scale roughly coincident with the average maturity of government debt. The longer the
government puts oﬀ the inevitable inﬂation, the larger the cumulative price increase must be.
Price stickiness or other frictions can further smooth inﬂation. In section 16 below, I consider
the output consequences of this inﬂa t i o np a t hi nas t a n d a r dN e w - K e y n e s i a nm o d e l . S i n c e
the inﬂation is expected, the inﬂationary episode corresponds to low output, to “stagﬂation”
or an adverse Phillips curve shift, not to a boom or movement along that curve.
In sum, long-term debt changes the dynamics substantially. However, the simple ﬂoating-






















Figure 3: Bond yields and inﬂation, from a 10% shock to expected surpluses ∆, when the
government sells debt to postpone inﬂation for 5 years. Numbers indicate the maturity of
the bond yields. The vertical line indicates the date of the surplus shock. I assume a 2%
constant real rate.
rate case remains a useful guide, if we remember to apply it on a scale of several years, and
I will do that in the following discussion.
3 The great recession, and “more of both” policy
With this conceptual framework in mind, we can examine the events of the great recession,
try to understand policy actions, and speculate about the future.
The ﬁrst issue is, why was there such a large fall in output? For once in macroeconomics
we actually know exactly what the shock was — there was a “run” in the shadow banking
system (See for example Gorton and Metrick, 2009b, or Duﬃe, 2010). But how did this
shock propagate to such a large recession?
We have long understood that a sharp precautionary increase in money demand, if not
met by money supply, would lead to a decline in aggregate demand. With price-stickiness
or dispersed information, a decline in aggregate demand can express itself as a decline in real
output rather than a decline in the price level. This is in essence Friedman and Schwartz’s
explanation for the great depression. However, this story cannot credibly apply to the 2008-
2009 recession. The Federal Reserve ﬂooded the country with money (reserves). There is no
evidence for a ﬂight to money at the expense of government bonds. There was no run on
commercial banks as in the great depression; in fact bank deposits increased substantially.
12T h e r ei si n s t e a de v i d e n c ef o rab r o a d e r“ ﬂight to quality,” a ﬂight to all government debt
at the expense of private debt and goods and services. In the ﬁscal analysis of (3), this is
a decline in the discount rate for government debt, which lowers aggregate demand. We
also can interpret many actions by the US and other governments as eﬀorts to exchange
government debt for private debt to satisfy that demand, as Friedman and Schwartz would
have had them exchange government debt for money.
This analysis may seem conservative; it rehabilitates a view of the recession close to a
standard monetary one, based on a notion of “aggregate demand” with real eﬀects, rather
than focusing on a “lending channel” or other credit frictions. However, it is also novel,
since demand and supply of all government debt take center stage, not demand and supply
for money.
3.1 Money supply and demand
To evaluate money supply and demand, Figure 4 shows the behavior of the Federal Funds
and 3 month Treasury bill rates. Figure 5 presents M1, currency and deposits, and Figure
6 describes Federal Reserve assets and liabilities
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Figure 4: Federal Funds and 3 month Treasury bill rates
As the ﬁnancial crisis took oﬀ in the third week of September 2008, the Federal reserve
swiftly cut the Federal Funds target to a range between 0 and 25 bp, and signaled it would
leave interest rates there for a long time (Figure 4). Inﬂation declined, never turned to
deﬂation so real rates on these assets remained near zero. M1, currency and deposits,
standard measures of money all increased substantially, shown in Figure 5. M1 rose $250b,
currency rose $100b and deposits spiked to $200b and leveled oﬀ about $120b. In percentage
terms, currency rose 15% and M1 rose 20%, all despite a fall in GDP. The expansion of











































Figure 5: Money stock













































Figure 6: Federal reserve assets and liablilities. Source: Federal Reserve H.4.1 release, June
25, 2009.
the Fed’s balance sheet in Figure 6 is the most dramatic. Excess reserves rose from $6b
to $800b. While it’s hard to disprove anything in economics, it certainly seems an uphill
battle to argue that the recession resulted from a failure by the Fed to accommodate shifts
in money demand.
143.2 More of both; aggregate demand
Conventional monetary policy only trades money for government debt. It considers demand
for more money and less government debt, and policy that controls this split. The events of
the great recession suggest a large increase in demand for both money and government debt.
All government bond interest rates declined sharply. Dramatic credit spreads opened. For
example, high rated tax-free municipal bonds (including those issued by universities such as
Harvard and Chicago) sold above treasuries. A large liquidity spread opened up between
on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run government issues. The dollar rose, putting a dramatic end to
the “carry trade.”
Figure 7 presents some of this evidence. You can see the rise in credit and term spreads.
Baa and Aaa rates rise, while the 3 month Treasury Bill rate declines; it was below the
Federal funds rate and even brieﬂy negative as shown in Figure 4 ; 3 month nonﬁnancial
commercial paper does not change much but ﬁnancial paper rises sharply. The Fed’s major
currencies index rose from 74.1 on Sept 22, to 82.0 on Nov. 3, a 10.6% rise, while the stock
market was crashing.
Quantities are harder to document than prices but reports were dramatic of markets that
“froze up” — issuers were unwilling to suﬀer these rates. And this is all despite strong eﬀorts
by the Fed. These events suggest a “ﬂight to quality” or “ﬂight to liquidity” from private
assets to U. S. debt of all maturities.



















Figure 7: Interest rates. Moody’s BAA and AAA; 10 year Treasury constant maturity and
3 month Treasury bill; 3 month nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial commercial paper
As one micro motivation for the ﬂight, government bonds became practically the only
security one could easily repo. (Gorton and Metrick 2009). In normal times, if you own a
corporate bond or a mortgage-backed security, you can sell it in a repurchase agreement or use
15it as collateral for a loan, thus ﬁnancing the bond purchase. In the Fall of 2008, suddenly the
collateral requirements increased dramatically. A government bond was as good as a dollar
to a large, cash-strapped ﬁnancial institution, because if you had a government bond, you
could borrow a dollar.
The combination of near-zero government rates and reserves paying interest, means that
the distinction between government bonds and money (reserves) was a third-order issue for
ﬁnancial institutions, especially compared to the very high interest rates, lack of collateral-
izability, and illiquidity of any instrument that carried a whiﬀ of credit risk. If they wanted
more of either, they wanted more of both.
In short, something like the “special” or “liquidity” services we usually associate with
money applied to all government debt for these central actors. Those services were related
to liquidity, transparency on balance sheets, acceptability as collateral, and absolute security
of nominal repayment, rather than the acceptability as means of payment in transactions
that we usually emphasize in money-demand theories.
(·)= does not allow us to address a “ﬂight to quality” of this this sort. We
c a nu n d e r s t a n di ti nt h eﬁscal framework, however, since that framework treats  and 
symmetrically. A sudden demand for government debt, with no (good) news about surpluses,
means that people are willing to hold that debt despite dramatically lower rates of return.
(Analogously, a sudden precautionary increase in money demand means people are willing
to hold money despite an increase in the interest rate, i.e. a lower relative rate of return for









a lower discount rate + raises the right hand side, and lowers aggregate demand on the
left. People want to hold more  and , while holding less private debt and less goods and
services.
(For the moment, I will not be speciﬁc about the mechanism by which a decline in
“aggregate demand” corresponds to a decline in output vs. prices. I’ll look at the simple
monetary and ﬁscal equations, think about inﬂationary and deﬂationary scenarios, and allow
some of that pressure to be reﬂected in output rather than prices. I return to this question
below.)
This analysis can apply more generally. First, it gives a new sense of the “reserve cur-
rency” nature of the dollar. In “ﬂight to quality” episodes, people seem to ﬂock to U.S.
debt, sending down long-term interest rates. The “reserve” aspect of the dollar is that for-
eign central banks and other institutions hold a lot of U.S. debt, much of it long-term, and
use this as backing for their own currencies. Arguably, the U.S. has ﬁnanced a good deal of
trade surplus by this one-time rise in U.S. debt holdings by foreigners, much as a government
might beneﬁt from seigniorage resulting from wider adoption of its currency. All of these
observations apply to debt as well as money, not to U.S. currency; the extra demand is
for U.S. government liabilities not dollar-denominated assets. Equation (12), with a low risk
premium applied to all U.S. government debt makes sense of these observations; a special de-
mand for U.S. currency or dollar-denominated private deposits, a version of (·)=
16does not.
Second, this mechanism for ﬂuctuations in “aggregate demand” may apply more generally
over time. Fluctuations in “aggregate demand” are somewhat mysterious, and ﬂuctuations
in demand for U. S. government debt do not easily line up with reasonable expectations
of future surpluses. But accounting for the history of U. S. stock prices by news about
expected dividends has been an even more catastrophic failure. The asset pricing literature
has concluded that time-varying discount rates account for essentially all stock market price
ﬂuctuations. Perhaps we can similarly account for “aggregate demand” ﬂuctuations by
changes in the discount rate for government debt rather than (or as well as) changes in
expectations of future surpluses. People ﬂy to quality quite generally in recessions.
This view predicts that a variance decomposition of (12) will ﬁnd that volatility in the
value of government debt on the left will largely correspond to volatility in expected returns
on the right rather than volatility in expected cashﬂows, just as Campbell and Shiller (1988),
Cochrane (1992, 2008) and many others ﬁnd for stocks, and even more analogously, as
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) ﬁnd for sovereign debt.
3.3 Accommodation and stimulus
We can understand many actions of the Treasury and Fed as attempts to accommodate the
demand for government debt vs. private debt as well as by accommodating the demand for
money relative to bonds.
Open-market debt operations
The Fed ran “open-market debt operations,” exchanging private debt for government debt
without changing the monetary base. As shown in Figure 6, between 2007 and September
2008, Treasuries and agency debt decline as a fraction of Fed assets (top graph), while the
overall size of the Fed’s balance sheet does not change much. From Jan 3 2007 to Sept. 3
2008, for example, Fed holdings of Treasury securities declined from $779b to $480b while
overall assets only increased from $911b to $946b. The Fed provided the private sector
about $300b of Treasury debt in exchange for corresponding private debt.
The “Treasury” item in Federal Reserve liabilities, the bottom graph in Figure 6 rep-
resents a similar operation. The rapid rise here represents the Treasury Supplementary
Financing Account. The Treasury sold additional debt and parked the proceeds with the
Fed. Starting with $4b on Sept. 9 2008, the total Treasury account hit a peak of $621b on
Nov. 11 and was $502b on Dec. 12. The Fed turned around and lent this money or bought
assets3. On net, the government issued Treasury debt in exchange for private debt.
How might an “open-market debt operation”; a switch of private for government debt
without changing , “stimulate” the economy? Let  denote private debt owned by the
3Lending and asset purchases are in many cases the same. Lending money creates private debt as an
asset on the Fed’s balance sheet.
17government. Our ﬁscal equation becomes








Iw r i t e( + ·) to capture the above idea that people are sometimes willing to hold
government debt despite a low rate of return; the same “quality” premium discussed above.
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2008) give evidence for a Treasury-debt liquidity
demand of this sort.)
Thus, by increasing the supply of Government debt, the discount rate  rises (or the
increased quantity oﬀsets the deﬂationary eﬀects of the ﬂight to quality, captured in the ·
terms). Aggregate demand increases, even if government holdings of private debt  oﬀset
greater government debt, so  −  is unchanged, even if money  is unchanged, and even
if there is no surplus news so  is unchanged.
Guarantees
The government also guaranteed large amounts of private debt, including Fannie and
Freddie, guarantees of TARP bank credit, and guarantees of new securitized debt. The
implicit guarantees of much larger amounts of debt — the widespread perception that no
large ﬁnancial institution will be allowed to fail — add to this list. To the extent that the
private sector has a liquidity demand for debt with the government’s credit rating, at the
expense of debt which does not carry that guarantee, issuing such guarantees is the same
thing as explicitly issuing Treasury debt in exchange for private debt.
Interest on reserves
The Fed has also started paying interest on reserves. Reserves that pay interest are
government debt. By creating such reserves the Fed can rapidly expand the supply of short-
term, ﬂoating rate debt, without needing any cooperation from the Treasury or a rise in the
Congressional debt limit. It also can execute massive open-market operations at the stroke
of a pen. With a trillion dollars of excess reserves, changing the interest on reserves from 0
to the overnight rate is exactly the same thing as a trillion-dollar open-market operation.
Balance sheet expansion
In the second phase of accommodation, starting in September 2008, the Fed rapidly
expanded its balance sheet. For the Fed, this means printing money (creating reserves) to
buy assets rather than just exchanging private for Treasury assets. In conventional open-
market operations, we would have seen Treasury debt in Fed assets rise in tandem with the
rise in reserves. Strikingly, the Fed took pains not to increase its holdings of Treasury debt,
and to leave such debt in private hands. Fed holdings of Treasury debt stay low through the
winter of 2009. The Fed funded the entire near-doubling of its liabilities by buying private
assets instead. We can think of this as a nearly $1trillion conventional monetary expansion
coupled with a $1trillion “open-market debt operation.”
The government also increased the supply of government debt overall. Not only is +−
 rearranged, it’s much larger by the $1.5 trillion ﬁscal deﬁcit. This might represent ﬁscal
18stimulus, described next, but even if + rises enough that there is no such ﬁscal stimulus,
this action can be seen as helping to accommodate the large demand for government debt.
In sum, in this analysis, we can read the government’s actions as a much-modiﬁed version
of Friedman and Schwartz’s advice for the great depression. In that event, the Fed failed
to accommodate a demand for money at the expense of government debt. In this one, the
government recognized and partially accommodated a massive demand for both money and
government debt, at the expense of private debt.
The Fed view
This is not how the Fed thinks about its policy actions, at least as I interpret Fed
statements. The ﬁrst stage, trading private for government debt without increasing money,
was, to the Fed, a way to support private credit markets without the inﬂationary eﬀect that
increasing  m i g h th a v eh a d . T h eF e dw a n t e dt os t i m u l a t ei nan o n i n ﬂationary way, an
idea beyond my simple analysis.
Similar thinking lies beyond the Fed’s asset purchases. Starting in October 2008, the Fed
started buying commercial paper, reaching $300b within a month. In early 2009, it started
buying mortgage-backed securities, both directly and via agencies (the thin blue wedge in the
top graph), and it started on an aggressive program of buying long-term treasuries, which
you can see in the rise of the “treasury” component of Figure 6.
As I read Fed statements, the Fed was trying to attack interest rate spreads in these
individual markets, not just to supply more government debt. The Fed sees somewhat
“segmented” markets with liquidity premia higher than it thinks are appropriate, and it
thinks that it can reduce the premiums in individual markets by buying securities in those
markets. It hoped to do so by small purchases, or through the act of trading — by becoming
the uninformed “noise trader” that liqueﬁes ﬁn a n c em o d e l s . I nt h ee v e n t ,i to f t e ne n d e d
up being almost the whole market for new issues, a position that makes aﬀecting prices
somewhat easier.
Whether the Fed was successful in aﬀecting individual premiums in this way is an inter-
esting question. Taylor (2009b) argues not, Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010) argue
yes. The opposite possibility is that the spreads on these assets represent credit risk and
credit risk premiums; that the markets are not as segmented or liquidity-constrained as the
Fed thinks, so that the Fed’s purchases can do little to lower spreads for very long.
In turn, as I read Fed statements, these actions will “stimulate” by reducing interest
rates faced by borrowers, also constrained to speciﬁc markets. Lower interest rates raise
“demand,” which in the ﬁrst instance raises output and later leads to inﬂation by Phillips
curve logic. This channel also requires frictions absent in my analysis.
Some of the issue is reminiscent of old debates in the analysis of monetary policy. When
the Fed exchanges money for bonds, does it lower interest rates and raise aggregate demand
by aﬀecting the supply of money, or by aﬀecting the supply of bonds? Conventional monetary
economics takes the former view. The issue here is similar: when the Fed trades government
debt for private debt, does this action aﬀect rates and the economy by changing the supply
of that particular form of private debt, or does it do so by changing the supply of government
19debt? Is the channel to overall demand via the interest rate on a particular form of private
debt, or via the overall demand for government debt? Perhaps some of both; at a minimum
my point is that the latter channel exists.
4 Fiscal - monetary stimulus
Fiscal stimulus
The U. S. government has also been engaged in a large “ﬁscal stimulus” designed to raise
aggregate demand, with multi-trillion dollar deﬁcits projected to last many years. From the
view of most macroeconomic theory, the level of government spending and deﬁcit ﬁnance
matter, not the part labeled “stimulus,” nor the nature of the spending, which dominate
public debate. Will these deﬁcits actually “stimulate” as promised?









oﬀers a twist on the standard view of this issue: If additional debt  +  corresponds
to expectations of higher future taxes or lower spending, it has no “stimulative” eﬀect.
(Again, I leave the nominal/real split for later.) If, however, additional debt corresponds
to expectations that future surpluses will not be raised, then indeed the the debt issue can
raise aggregate demand.
This sounds like fairly standard “Ricardian equivalence” analysis. However, standard
Ricardian equivalence presumes that the government issues real debt, always corresponding
to higher expected future surpluses, so that some irrationality, market incompleteness or
market failure is needed for any stimulative eﬀect. Here, we realize that the government
issues nominal d e b t . I tc a nb ep e r f e c t l yr a t i o n a lf o rp e o p l et oe x p e c tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
does not plan to raise future surpluses, but that it plans instead to monetize debt when the
debt comes due. And when they expect debt to be inﬂated away in the future, they try to
dump it today.
I am abstracting here from distorting taxes, ﬁnancial frictions, output composition ef-
fects, and the price-stickiness and multiple equilibria of New-Keynesian models, all of which
potentially have important eﬀects on the analysis of ﬁscal stimulus.. For example, Uhlig
(2010) emphasizes distorting taxes; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2010) get large
Ricardian (tax-ﬁnanced are the same as deﬁcit-ﬁnanced) multipliers out of a New-Keynesian
model with zero interest rates. My goal is only to analyze what  =  and (14) have
to say about the issue before one adds other considerations, not to deny other channels or
try to have a last word on an 80 year old debate.
Will spending come too late?
Many critics objected that ﬁscal stimulus won’t stimulate in time, because the spending
will come too late, after the recession is over. This reﬂects the standard analysis, enshrined in
20undergraduate textbooks since the 1970s, that ﬁscal policy, aﬀects “demand” as it is spent.
Equation (14) suggests the opposite conclusion. In order to get stimulus (inﬂation) now,
future deﬁcits (+ for large )a r ej u s ta se ﬀe c t i v ea sc u r r e n td e ﬁcits, and possibly more so.
What matters is to communicate eﬀectively how that future deﬁcits will be large, unlikely
ever to be paid oﬀ with surpluses.
Expectations.
A ﬁscal stimulus/inﬂation is harder than it sounds. Government debt sales are delib-
erately set up to engender expectations that the debt will be paid oﬀ.M o s t o f t h e t i m e ,
governments do not sell debt to inﬂate; they sell debt to raise real resources that they can
use for temporary expenditures like wars. If a debt sale comes with no change in expected
future surpluses, it only raises interest rates and the price level. It raises no real revenue,
and does not raise the real value of outstanding debt. Governments are usually very careful
to communicate that this is not the case.
As an extreme contrast, consider a currency reform in which the government redeems the
old currency and issues new currency with three zeros missing. This operation is exactly a
debt rollover in which  = −∆1000, with no change in future surpluses, and no revenue.
A currency reform is designed to communicate expectations that real surpluses will not
change, precisely so that it will move the price level the next day and will not generate any
revenue. The only diﬀerence between a currency reform and a debt sale is the expectations
of future surpluses that each communicates.
Since the institution of a government debt sale is designed to convey the expectation
that deﬁcits will eventually be paid oﬀ, engendering the opposite expectations may be quite
diﬃcult. Everyone is used to meaningless long-term budget projections, especially in the U.
S.
Currency reforms also have no output eﬀects. Whatever price-stickiness, information
asymmetry, or coordination problem gives rise to some temporary output rise from inﬂation,
that mechanism is completely absent when the government undertakes a currency reform.
Thus, the job for ﬁscal stimulus, in this analysis, is to sell debt while communicating that
future surpluses will not rise — so that there will be some stimulus — but to do so in such a
way that exploits whatever price stickiness or information asymmetry generates an output
eﬀect, which a currency will not do. Considering our knowledge about the precise mechanism
o ft h eP h i l l i p sc u r v e ,t h i si sac h a l l e n g i n gt a s k .
Quantitative easing; Helicopters; Joint Monetary/Fiscal policy; Japan.
F i s c a ls t i m u l u sc a m eo ﬀ the bookshelf in part because of the widespread view that mon-
etary policy can do no more once interest rates hit zero.
When interest rates hit zero, the Fed can still pursue “quantitative easing.” It can continue
to buy Treasury or other debt, or lend directly, and thereby increase the money supply, even
if these actions no longer aﬀect short-term rates. People who think in terms of monetary
aggregates rather than interest rates have advocated such easing. The Bank of England
explicitly engaged in a quantitative easing program, and many commentators view the U. S.
reserve expansion in this light.
21But in our framework, it’s hard to see how quantitative easing can have any eﬀect. The
Fed can increase reserves  and decrease , but nobody cares if it does so. Agents are
happy to trade perfect substitutes at will. Velocity  will simply absorbs any further changes.
T h ea r g u m e n tm u s tr e s to nt h ei d e at h a t is ﬁxed, but why should the relative demand
for perfect substitutes be ﬁxed? (With interest on reserves, the same logic applies even at
nonzero interest rates, and one would expect the argument to hold as an approximation at
small positive rates.)
What about a “helicopter drop?” Wouldn’t this increase money  and inﬂate? A heli-
copter drop is at heart a ﬁscal operation. To implement a drop in the U. S., the Treasury
would borrow money, issuing more debt. It would spend the money as a government trans-
fer. Then the Federal Reserve would buy the debt, so that the money supply increased. A
real drop of real cash from real helicopters would be recorded as a transfer payment, a ﬁscal
operation. Conversely, even a helicopter drop would not be “stimulative” if everyone knew
that the money would be soaked up the next day in higher taxes, or by the Fed, i.e. by
future taxes.
Thus, Milton Friedman’s helicopters have nothing really to do with money. They are
instead a brilliant device to dramatically communicate that this cash does not correspond to
higher future ﬁscal surpluses; that this money will be left out in public hands as in a currency
reform. To be eﬀective, a monetary expansion at near zero rates must be accompanied by a
non-Ricardian ﬁscal expansion as well. People must understand that the new debt or money
does not just correspond to higher future surpluses.
T h el a s tt i m et h e s ei s s u e sc a m eu pw a sJ a p a n e s em o n e t a r ya n dﬁscal policy in the 1990s,
to escape its long period of stagnation, low inﬂation and near-zero interest rates. Quantitative
easing and huge ﬁscal deﬁcits were all tried, and did not lead to inﬂation or much “stimulus.”
Why not? The answer must be that people were simply not convinced that the government
would fail to pay oﬀ its debts. Critics of the Japanese government essentially point out their
statements sounded pretty lukewarm about commitment to the inﬂationary project, perhaps
wisely.
In sum, what matters, especially in an environment of near-zero rates, is the expectation
of future deﬁcits and surpluses. If you cannot persuade people that future surpluses will be
absent, then exchanges of money for debt have no eﬀect, and increases in money or debt have
no eﬀect. If you can convince people that these are lower than the real value of outstanding
debt, then you can get inﬂation and, perhaps, some real stimulation along the way. But
in that event, whether you drop money or treasury bills from the helicopter makes little
diﬀerence.
Identiﬁcation
This analysis implies that historical evaluation of ﬁscal multipliers suﬀers a (an addi-
tional) deep identiﬁcation problem. What were expectations in previous events? If people
expected eventual inﬂation, i.e. that the debt would not be paid oﬀ, we should see increased
aggregate demand, and we would be able to measure the presence or absence of associated
real stimulus. That experience would not inform us about the eﬀects of a stimulus package
that did come with a commitment not to inﬂate and therefore the expectation that future
22tax revenues would rise.
Expectations whether debt will be paid or inﬂated can vary considerably with the circum-
stances of the event. Wars are quite diﬀerent from recession-ﬁghting stimulus packages, and
those are diﬀerent from large promised social and retirement programs. Furthermore, stimu-
lus packages come with diﬀerent ﬁscal backgrounds. For example, Chile, with a large positive
net asset position, is likely to face diﬀerent expectations about long-run ﬁscal solvency of a
large stimulus plan than are Italy or Greece, with larger outstanding debt.
4.1 What are expectations?
With this perspective in mind, what are expectations of future surpluses and deﬁcits?
Government announcements
On one hand, we can take the Government’s dramatic deﬁcit projections surrounding the
stimulus bill in January and February 2009 as loud announcements “you’d better spend the
money now, because we’re sure not raising taxes or cutting spending enough to soak it up.”
And long-term budget projections remain bleak. On March 20 2009 OMB director Peter
Orszag was quoted to say “Over the medium to long term, the nation is on an unsustainable
ﬁscal course.” “Unsustainable” literally means that the right hand side of the ﬁscal equation
is lower than the left. The normally staid Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s (2009) Long Term
Budget Update echoes the sentiment: “Over the long term ... the budget remains on an
unsustainable path,” complete with graphs of exponentially exploding debt.
On the other hand, the main problem in long-term budget projections are Social Security
and medical entitlements. We’ve known that these programs are on an unsustainable course
for years. This was not news during the winter of 2009. Markets had long had a reasonable
expectation that sooner or later the government would get around to doing something about
them. Furthermore, by spring 2009, the tone of government statements had changed com-
pletely from “stimulus” to concern over long-term budget deﬁcits and a desire to lower them,
not commit to them. OMB director Orszag’s March 20 2009 “unsustainable” comment was
followed quickly by “to be responsible, we must begin the process of ﬁscal reform now.” It
was delivered at a “Fiscal Responsibility Summit.”
Most of the Administration’s defense of ﬁscal stimulus (for example, Bernstein and Romer
2009) cites simple Keynesian ﬂow multipliers from 1960s-vintage ISLM models, not the
sort of ﬁscal-monetary inﬂation I have described as “stimulus.” And by May, even these
statements gave way to worries about ﬁscal sustainability that can be read as dramatically
negative multipliers. For example, the Council of Economic Advisers’ (2009) health policy
analysis states that “slowing the growth rate of health care costs will prevent disastrous
increases in the Federal budget deﬁcit” and will raise the level of GDP by 8%, permanently.
By the winter of 2009-2010 the word “stimulus” disappeared from the Administration’s
lexicon. Arguments for “jobs” and mortgage-relief legislation made no mention of increasing
the deﬁcit, but were defended as microeconomic interventions that would help even if tax-
supported. Chairman Bernanke’s June 3 (2009b) testimony worries about long-term deﬁcits,
23and thus whether the ﬁscal backing to contain rather than to produce inﬂation will be present.
Furthermore, Chairman Bernanke and the other Federal Reserve Governors are loudly
saying the Fed can and will control inﬂa t i o n .W h e t h e rt h eF e dw i l lb ea b l et od os oi sa n o t h e r
question, but at least we hear determination to ﬁght and win any game of chicken with the
Treasury. Secretary Geithner went out of his way to assure the Chinese that the dollar will
not be inﬂated (Cha 2009).
In sum, government statements do not paint a clear picture. This may reﬂect an under-
standable indecision on the part of the government facing a Catch-22: In this analysis, the
only way to “stimulate” is to commit forcefully and credibly to an unsustainable ﬁscal path,
so that people will try to get rid of their government debt including money, and in so doing
drive up demand for goods, services, and real assets. But such an action trades stimulus
today for great ﬁnancial and economic diﬃculty when deﬁcits and inﬂation arrive.
Measuring Ricardian expectations
Ideally, none of this would matter. The bond market should let us measure private ex-
pectations. If the government sells additional debt and the private sector does not believe
that debt will correspond to additional surpluses, then the real value of debt remains con-
stant, the government raises no real revenue from the debt sale, and interest rates rise with
inﬂation expectations. We know that interest rates and inﬂa t i o nh a v es t a y e dl o w ,a n dt h e
government has raised trillions of dollars of revenue from its debt sales, and the real value
of debt has risen dramatically. These facts suggest that for now, people believe that larger
debt and near-term deﬁcits are matched by expectations of longer-term surpluses. This
observation also means that there hasn’t been much ﬁscal-monetary stimulus as yet.
This analysis is clouded a bit by long-term debt. With outstanding long-term debt, the
government can raise revenue from sales of long-term debt, diluting the outstanding long-
term debt, as explained in Section 2.4. However, our government is raising revenue from
short term debt sales, and the Fed actively purchased long-term debt, in an attempt to
lower, not raise, interest rates.
More plausibly, we have to remember that economics is never easy because supply and
demand both move. Long-term rates may reﬂect a good deal of ﬂight-to-quality premium —
lower  i nt h ef a c eo fl o w e r, as argued above. We know that the expectations model of
the term structure is a poor empirical ﬁt. Thus, it’s not immediately easy to read inﬂation
expectations from the yield curve, nor to measure how much “stimulus” bond sales drove up
nominal interest rates over what they would otherwise be. Other inﬂation indicators — the
price of gold, for example — are rising steeply
245I n ﬂation or deﬂation?
5.1 Money and inﬂation
Is a large inﬂa t i o no nt h ew a y ?W h e nt h et i m ec o m e st or e v e r s ec o u r s e ,w i l lt h eF e db e
willing to do so? More troubling, will the Fed be able to do so, or will we discover the ﬁscal
limits to monetary policy? Will mounting ﬁscal deﬁcits instead force the Fed to monetize
even more debt? Will we in fact see a ﬁscal inﬂation without current monetization, but based
on a ﬂight from the dollar, a fear of future monetization, as (3) describes?
Opinions through 2009 were certainly mixed. Paul Krugman (2009) argues that “Deﬂa-
tion, not inﬂation, is the clear and present danger.” Fed oﬃcials have given many comforting
speeches on their “exit strategy.” But Niall Ferguson (2009) Martin Feldstein (2009) and
Anna Schwartz (Satow 2009) think inﬂation is on its way. Arthur Laﬀer (2009) thinks some-
thing like hyperinﬂation is on the way. These debates continue, with reports of a heated
discussion within the Federal Reserve (Hilsenrath 2010).
MV = PY
Some inﬂation hawks simply look at the vast amount of reserves and the smaller but
substantial increase in M1 and currency, and infer that inﬂation must follow. Some of
these observers, I think, are echoing a view that in  = , velocity is stable, but
“long and variable lags” transmit money to inﬂation, so that past money must imply future




In my view, this is simplistic: We now know that velocity does shift, especially at near-
zero rates, and that today’s money need not mean tomorrow’s inﬂation if the Fed soaks that
money up fast enough. What the Fed giveth, the Fed can taketh away.
For example, Laﬀer (2009) thinks M1 is the right aggregate; he worries that the huge
expansion in reserves means more M1 expansion to come. Moreover, he worries that this
process will then be diﬃcult to reverse. If the Fed tries to soak up reserves, he thinks it
will require a massive contraction in bank lending in order to reduce the relevant 1,w h i c h
will require a sharp recession that the Fed will not be willing to countenance. In the dove’s
view, we are still in a “liquidity trap” so the extra reserves aren’t going anywhere in the ﬁrst
place.
I argued above that banks are just as happy to hold reserves as to hold government
bonds. Their lending activity is disconnected from their reserve holdings. The fact that
reserves now pay interest dramatically changes our interpretation of the data. Reserves that
pay market interest are debt, not money. Finally, one can argue how diﬃcult it will be
for the Fed in fact to soak up aggregates even if the latter do expand. With ample excess
reserves, and much interest-bearing bank ﬁnancing, there is no necessary connection between
the amount of bank lending or overall credit and the stock of any monetary aggregate. A
cashless economy will still have lots of loans.
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Feldstein (2009) points out that the Fed no longer has much Treasury debt, as you can
see in Figure 6. If it wants to soak up reserves, it may be very hard to sell all the illiquid,
long-dated and risky private securities that the Fed has accumulated, and impossible to
sell direct loans. Feldstein writes “..the commercial banks may not want to exchange their
reserves for the mountain of private debt that the Fed is holding and the Fed lacks enough
Treasury bonds with which to conduct ordinary open market operations..”
I do not think this is much of a constraint—or rather it’s an internal political constraint
not a fundamental economic constraint. There is nothing that stops the Fed and Treasury
together from simply issuing new Treasury debt to soak up the trillion dollars or so of
reserves, even if the Fed has nothing left on its balance sheet. The Treasury can issue new
debt, and simply deposit the proceeds with the Fed, as it already did; the Fed need only
abstain from lending them out again. Furthermore, by raising the interest rate on reserves,
the Fed can essentially create debt and execute an open-market operation with the stroke of
ap e n .
Will and ideas
Many inﬂation hawks really have in mind political rather than economic constraints,
which my analysis has little to say about. They question whether the Fed will have the will
or political ability to start soaking up reserves or raising short-term interest rates quickly
enough. The “credit crunch” and “ﬁnancial crisis” were over by mid 2009 — short-term debt
spreads returned if not to normal, at least to functioning levels. The “ﬂight to quality” is
fading as well, and long-term rates rebounded. Yet we will still be in a serious recession for
some time. Commercial real estate, state debt, and some pension funds are still in trouble.
Mortgage foreclosures are continuing. Unemployment will be high for some time. Many
ﬁnancial institutions will still be on the edge, and many of them make a lot of money by
borrowing low and short and lending long. To the extent that the Fed’s asset purchases
lowered speciﬁc rates in commercial paper, mortgage and other markets, now there are
constituencies who can plead for speciﬁcs u p p o r t .
Constraints imposed by ideas and information are a more subtle route to inﬂation. This
path constitutes the conventional analysis of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e1 9 7 0 s( F o re x a m p l e ,s e eS a r g e n t
1999 and Samuelson 2008). Will the Fed’s “potential GDP” estimates, as in the 1970s,
suggest large and illusory “gaps” remaining to be ﬁlled? Will the Fed interpret house and
stock prices below their peaks as “asset price deﬂation” that counteracts goods and services
inﬂation? Will the Fed continue to believe that expectations are “anchored” until they
no longer are, when it is too late? The Fed seems focused on “managing expectations” by
announcements rather than direct open market operations in order to control inﬂation. Will
it continue too long to trust in that ability?
Fiscal constraints on a monetary exit
I conclude that no substantial monetary or economic problems stop the government from
soaking up whatever assets constitute the  in  =  and removing monetary stimulus,
if it wants to do so and if it can suﬀer the higher short-term interest rates that this action
26may provoke. The remaining question is ﬁscal backing — whether the government will be
able to undo monetary expansion.
For the next several years, the Treasury will still be selling trillions of additional debt
to ﬁnance deﬁcits. If investors and the Treasury are also trying to sell, can the Fed sell
additional trillions as well? For example, Laﬀer (2009) writes “If the Fed were to reduce the
monetary base by $1 trillion, it would need to sell a net $1 trillion in bonds. This would put
the Fed in direct competition with Treasury’s planned issuance of about $2 trillion worth of
bonds over the coming 12 months. Failed auctions would become the norm and bond prices
would tumble, reﬂecting a massive oversupply of government bonds.” By (3), or better (13),
this is false. Prospective investors in new government debt were already holding currency
or reserves, which are just a diﬀerent maturity of government debt. It takes almost no
additional ﬁscal resources to unwind a reserve or currency expansion. (“Almost” because of
the potentially higher interest cost of non-monetary debt, but seigniorage is tiny; 1% of $1
trillion dollars is $10 billion.) Additional resources, new debt issues matched by higher future
surpluses, are important to a government that needs foreign reserves, gold reserves, etc. in
order to unwind a monetary expansion, but not to a government that wants to unwind an
expansion of domestic reserves.
I conclude that the U. S. has both the ability and ﬁscal capacity to rapidly unwind its
monetary expansion, should the government choose to do so.
5.2 Fiscal inﬂation
A ﬁscal inﬂation, the consequence of current and future deﬁcits, are therefore, in this analysis,
ag r e a t e ri n ﬂation danger than monetary policy and the existence of an “exit strategy.”
Reading the commentators, I think there is in fact widespread agreement on this danger,
just diverging opinion as to its probability. Even Krugman (2009) admits “others claim
that budget deﬁcits will eventually force the U.S. government to inﬂate away its debt...”
The possibility is that the U. S. will “ drive up prices so that the real value of the debt is
reduced. Such things have happened in the past. For example, France ultimately inﬂated
away much of the debt it incurred while ﬁghting World War I.” The danger is well described
by (3); he just doesn’t think it will happen.
How exactly does this work, what are the warning signs? Here again, I think looking at
(3) clariﬁes some issues and points out some common traps.
Debt/GDP ratios and future deﬁcits
Krugman and other inﬂation doves assure us that the U. S. debt/GDP ratio is below
that of many other countries, and our own past experience. The CBO analysis in Elmendorf
(2009), for example, shows our current debt/GDP at 40%, and projected to rise to 60%
during the current recession. This is small compared to the 110% debt/GDP ratio at the
end of WWII, and the ratios over 100% that several European countries and Japan now
experience.
The long-term U. S. budget outlook is much more bleak. It is unusual that even the
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“unsustainable” trends are driven by social security and health expenditures, not recession-
ﬁghting stimulus, and even under the CBO’s more plausible “alternative ﬁscal scenario” we
only reach 100% of GDP in about 2022 and 200% of GDP in 2035. What’s to worry about?
Most of all, the ﬁscal equation (3) does not point to a “sustainable” debt/GDP ratio
— say 100% — and “everything will be ﬁne until you cross this point.” Equation (3) says
that you get inﬂation now as soon as people think that future debt/GDP ratios will grow
uncontrollably, i.e. the left hand side is greater than the right. If anyone believed the CBO’s
long-term forecasts, inﬂation would have already happened. People expect that eventually
the government will do something about Social Security, Medicare and entitlements. Other
countries have experienced exchange rate collapses — meaning, their governments were unable
to pledge enough real resources to borrow foreign exchange reserves — with much lower
than 100% current debt/GDP ratios, when markets saw unsustainable prospective deﬁcits.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo’s (2001) analysis of the 1997 Asian currency crashes are
a good example, and the international literature ﬁnds that current debt/GPD ratios are
generally not a good forecast of currency crashes or their absence. Conversely, even very
l a r g ed e b ti sp o s s i b l ei fp e o p l eu nderstand there is a plan to pay it oﬀ. The U.S. could
borrow 120% of GDP at the end of WWII because everyone understood war expenditures
were temporary, we won the war, and that huge deﬁcits would end once that temporary
exigency passed. Finally, the fact that other countries have greater debt could only mean
that they we will all experience inﬂation.
GDP is not even a very good divisor. U. S. Federal tax revenues are about 15% of GDP,
so a 60% debt/GDP ratio is a 400% debt/revenue ratio. Comparing debt to GDP only
makes sense across countries with comparable tax systems. To harvest European taxes, the
U.S. would have to institute a national VAT, which will hardly be painless. To put the
observation another way, we can ask what changes in tax rates under the current U.S. tax
system would eliminate forecasted deﬁcits. Congressional Budget Oﬃce Director Peter Orzag
(2008) did this, concluding that the lowest bracket would have to rise from 10 percent to 25
percent; the 25-percent bracket would have rise to 63 percent; and the top rate would have to
rise from 35 percent to 88 percent, before considering any eﬀort or evasion eﬀects. Including
such eﬀects, the needed tax revenues are beyond the top of the Laﬀer curve: “Such tax rates
would signiﬁcantly reduce economic activity and would create serious problems with tax
avoidance and tax evasion. Revenues would probably fall signiﬁcantly short of the amount
needed to ﬁnance the growth of spending; therefore, tax rates at such levels would not be
feasible.”
Bond rating agencies use other ratios as well. Graham (2010) reports that Moody’s may
downgrade US government debt from AAA status as soon as 2013, based on CBO projections
that interest will climb to 20% of revenue. Interest expense/revenue is not a sure sign of
ﬁscal trouble or security as well, but can point in a quite diﬀerent direction from current
debt/GDP.
Crowding out
Much discussion of the dangers of deﬁcits focuses on the ﬂow of spending, and its potential
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savings. The fact that international debt markets are huge and there is little historical
association between deﬁcits and interest rates has always argued against this mechanism.
In any case, nothing like this mechanism is mirrored in the ﬁscal equation (3). One can
have high inﬂa t i o nw i t hn oc u r r e n td e ﬁcits at all, if expected future deﬁcits are high. The
size of U.S. debt relative to international markets is irrelevant; what matters is the size of
U. S. debt relative to the U. S. ability to run surpluses. Long-term nominal rates do not
rise because ﬂow deﬁcits crowd out private investment. They simply reﬂect expected future
inﬂation and a risk premium for government debt.
Seigniorage, monetization, “chicken.”
Most writing about the dangers of deﬁcits focuses on the idea that the Fed will have to
monetize deﬁcits, this action will raise the money stock, and only then will inﬂation break
out. Equation (3) emphasizes that we can have inﬂation now when people expect future
monetization. We do not have to wait for seigniorage. There doesn’t even have to be any
seigniorage.
Now, (·)= r e m i n d su st h a te v e naﬁscal inﬂation has to be accommodated by
monetary authorities. If  in the ﬁscal equation rises, but the Fed adamantly refuses to raise
, we have an “uncoordinated policy.” One side must give way in a “game of chicken.” The
Fed gives way automatically when it follows an interest rate target or otherwise passively
adjusts money in response to liquidity needs, as it has been explicitly and aggressively doing
for the past year. Whether it can prevail in a serious ﬁscal exigency is an interesting and
open question. Would the Fed refuse to monetize if the U.S. ran in to very high interest rates
when trying to roll over debt? Or would it quickly give in, as the ECB did in purchasing
junk-rated Greek bonds?
The picture
In sum, the ﬁscal valuation equation








and experience of past ﬁscally-induced collapses paints a far diﬀerent picture of a ﬁscal
inﬂation than in most commentator’s scenarios. This equation looks (and is) a lot like
the valuation equation for a stock. Hence, a ﬁscal inﬂation may well look like a stock
market collapse. The tipping point, where investors change expectations of long-term future
surpluses , valuations of government-held assets , or require larger real risk premiums
 to hold them, can come quickly and unpredictably, without necessarily large current
debt/GDP, large current deﬁcits, large current monetization; without strong “demand” and
small “gaps.” It can come as a surprise to a Federal Reserve and to economists unused to
thinking about ﬁscal limits to monetary policy. Since the long present value results from
rolling over short-term debt, diﬃculties in that roll over may be one of the ﬁrst signs.
Where is the ﬁscal limit? I don’t know. But there is a ﬁscal limit, and wherever it is,
we are a few trillion dollars closer to it than we were last year, and we will be another few
29trillion dollars closer next year. The next two considerations suggest it is closer than we
think.
5.3 Credit guarantees, nominal commitments, and the ﬁscal limit
If oﬃcial debt-to-GDP ratios are “only” headed to 100% or so, there is still a lot of oﬀ-the-
books nominal debt. Deﬁne-beneﬁt pensions, unused nominal depreciation allowances, and
even nominally-sticky government salaries are all forms of nominal debt.
The U.S. government has made very large credit guarantees. The government has explic-
itly guaranteed Fannie and Freddie debt and underlying mortgages, the TARP banks debt,
student loans, and many others. Implicit guarantees are potentially as large or larger. Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke4 has pretty much guaranteed that no large ﬁnancial ﬁrm will fail.
Immense bailouts loom of state and local governments, deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans, and
foreign sovereign debt either directly or via the IMF. For example, Rauh and Novy-Marx
(2009) estimate that state pension obligations are underfunded by $3.23 trillion, dwarﬁng
the states’ publicly traded debt of $0.94 trillion. The Federal Government is unlikely to let
states or their pensions default.
Credit guarantees have two eﬀects. First, and most obviously, having to make good on
these guarantees on top of large budget deﬁcits can be the piece of bad news that kicks
expectations over the ﬁscal limit. Second, nominal credit guarantees and other nominal
or poorly indexed commitments, mean that government ﬁnances are much better if there
is inﬂation. Higher nominal real estate prices will surely make the government’s mortgage
and banking guarantees much easier to fulﬁll. We can treat these guarantees as additional
nominal debt, or we can count the ﬂows, and recognize that surpluses are not independent









with 0()  0. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2006) ﬁnd that the Korean
devaluation helped government ﬁnances largely by lowering the real value of nominal wages
paid to government workers, rather than devaluing domestically-denominated nominal debt
— the mechanism was () not . More deeply, guarantees are options with a nonlinear
payoﬀ,m a k i n gd e ﬂation much worse than inﬂation is helpful for government ﬁnances.
This consideration means that a smaller inﬂation can solve a larger budget problem, since
ar i s ei n makes the right side larger as well as the left side smaller. Put another way, the
U.S. problem, large prospective deﬁcits with a relatively small stock of outstanding debt,
would otherwise put us in a real ﬁscal pickle, since we can’t devalue debt we haven’t issued
yet. Even an inﬁnite price level — a default of all outstanding US debt, cutting future interest
payments to zero — is not enough to pay for the CBO’s projections of Social Security and
4See Bernanke (2009a), and in particular, “..government assistance to avoid the failures of major ﬁnancial
institutions has been necessary to avoid a further serious destabilization of the ﬁnancial system, and our
commitment to avoiding such a failure remains ﬁrm.”
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makes it much more likely that the government will choose inﬂation rather than explicit
spending cuts. Again, one should not think of surpluses as exogenous in this ﬁscal analysis.
Really we should think of the Government’s decision to inﬂate, trading oﬀ distorting taxes,
useful or politically popular spending, and the distortions caused by inﬂation, and the ability
to place blame elsewhere in making this decision.
5.4 The dynamic Laﬀer curve and the ﬁscal limit
The point at which higher taxation simply cannot raise any more revenue — the top of the
“Laﬀer curve” — is one ﬁscal limit5.S i n c e present values matter, small eﬀects of tax rates on
growth can put us at the ﬁscal limit much sooner than static analysis suggests. Thus, a high
marginal tax and interventionist policy which stunts growth can be particularly dangerous
for setting oﬀ a ﬁscal inﬂation.
We are used to thinking of the static Laﬀer curve, in which tax revenue  is generated
by a tax rate  from income  as
()=






The second term is negative — higher taxes lower output (and, more so, reported income),
so the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to tax rates is less than one. The top of the
Laﬀer curve is where the elasticity is equal to zero, so higher tax rates raise no revenue.
Many economists think the U.S. is comfortably below that point. For example, a rise
in the tax rate from  =0 30 to  =0 35 is a 15% (log(035030) = 015) increase, so it
would have to result in a 15% decline in taxable output before it generates no additional
revenue. (Yes, this calculation is too simple. The point is to contrast this calculation with
the dynamic calculation below, not to assess realistically the U.S. tax system. Trabandt
and Uhlig (2009) oﬀer a detailed Laﬀer calculation with ﬁxed productivity growth and no
migration, yielding the result that the US is substantially below the Laﬀer limit.) More
people voiced concern that the UK’s recent move to a 50% marginal rate plus VAT put it
above the top, especially since high-wealth people can leave. When tax rates are already
high, the same percentage point tax rate rise is a smaller percentage (log) rise, so smaller
output eﬀects of each percentage point tax rise are necessary to oﬀset the tax rate increase.
The present value of future tax revenues is what matters for the ﬁscal valuation equation,
however. For a simple calculation, suppose growth of taxable income is steady at rate  and









5See Piergallini and Rodano (2009) for a model of the Laﬀer limit in ﬁscal theory.











We see there is an additional term, which is also negative.
Since  −  is a small number, small growth eﬀects can have a big impact on the ﬁscal
limit. For example, if  −  =0 02,t h e nlog = −002 puts us at the ﬁscal limit
immediately. Thus, if a rise in  from 30% to 35% only implies a 002 × 015 = 03%
reduction in long term growth, then we’re at the ﬁscal limit already, disregarding the ﬂow
eﬀect  loglog entirely.
I do not digress here to the economics by which marginal tax rates lower the level or
growth rate of output. The disincentive eﬀects of working, saving or investing, and the in-
centives for tax evasion, are widely discussed. Migration of high-wealth people and businesses
is perhaps even more important, especially to small countries: Even if growth per capita is
not aﬀected by distorting taxes, fewer capitas mean less tax revenue. Growth theory points
to accumulation of knowledge as the main driver of long run per-capita growth rates, but I
don’t want to stop here to model how distorting taxes interfere with that process, nor tie
the calculation to one particular such model.
6 Phillips curves—Will inﬂation “stimulate?”
The point of stimulus is not to inﬂate, of course, but to boost output in the short run. Many
economists argue that a little inﬂation isn’t such a bad thing in the current circumstance,
as they argued for deliberate inﬂation in Japan in the 1990s. For example, Greg Mankiw
and Ken Rogoﬀ are quoted in Miller (2009) as being in favor of inﬂation, on Phillips curve
grounds to raise output as well as to bail out borrowers at the expense of nominal debt
holders.
I have not described a particular mechanism for output eﬀects, in part because both the
theory and experience of Phillips curves under ﬁscal inﬂations is unexplored territory. But
it is worth remembering that not all inﬂations come with output booms either in theory or in
practical experience. There is no guarantee that inﬂation will “stimulate” the real economy.
Inﬂation with real stagnation is a possibility too.
Experience
We have many precedents against a rigid Phillips curve in traditional monetary analyses
and historical experience. Of course we all understand that currency reforms (exchanging
old currency for new, with fewer zeros, or moving to the Euro) change the price level with
no output eﬀects at all.
The 1970s had inﬂation with recession or stagnation. This experience is captured in two
ideas: “aggregate supply” shifted adversely, and inﬂation expectations rose, or its “anchor-
ing” disappeared, shifting the Phillips curve up and to the right. As a visual reminder of
32how weak even the Phillips curve correlation is, Figures 8 and 9 present a history of U.S.
inﬂation and unemployment, broken up into two subperiods for visual clarity.




































Inflation and unemployment, 1966−1984
Figure 8: CPI inﬂation and unemployment, 1966-1984











































Inflation and unemployment, 1984−2009
Figure 9: CPI inﬂation and unemployment, 1984-2009
The larger history of ﬁscal inﬂations and currency collapses does not inspire hope that
a ﬁscal inﬂation always results in prosperity. The hyperinﬂations that follow wars (Sargent
1992), Latin American ﬁscal collapses, currency crashes, or the recent hyperinﬂation in
Zimbabwe were associated with sharp declines in economic conditions, not the spectacular
booms that a simple Phillips curve might predict.
This wider experience is worth considering. Most economists view the postwar U. S.
experience as one that comes from a regime in which the ﬁscal constraint was not important.
If we run in to ﬁscal constraints, however, our future will not be drawn from this same
33experience. If that happens, we may ﬁnd that a comfortable idea of booms associated with
inﬂations will vanish once again.
Fiscal anchor. Fiscal stagﬂation? Explicit models.
In any monetary-ﬁscal analysis, the ﬁscal equation (3) is a central part of the “anchoring”
of inﬂation expectations necessary for successful monetary policy. Monetary policy needs
ﬁscal backing. This insight suggests that a ﬁscal inﬂation is likely to correspond to a “Phillips
curve shift,” which would lead to stagﬂation, not inﬂation with a boom. A ﬁscal inﬂation
may also correspond to poor output through an “aggregate supply shift;” Governments resort
to distorting taxes before they “default” through inﬂation.
To give one quantitative assessment of a ﬁscal inﬂation’s output eﬀects, I use a textbook
New-Keynesian model, for example see Woodford (2003),
 = +1 −  (15)
 = +1 +  (16)
 =  + +1 (17)
where each symbol represents deviations from a steady state. ( is output,  is the real rate,
 is inﬂation, and  is the nominal rate. The second equation is the New-Keynesian Phillips
curve.) Given the response of inﬂation to a shock, and in particular a choice of one of the
inﬂation scenarios in Figure 3, we can simply compute the corresponding paths for output,
and real and nominal interest rate responses to the shock, {}{} and {},f r o m( 1 6 ) ,
(15) and (17) in turn. We can regard the interest rate path as a calculation of what interest
rate policy was required to lead to the inﬂation outcome6.
Figure 10 gives the results. In response to a time-zero surplus present value shock, I
specify a path for inﬂation similar to that in the delayed-inﬂation scenario of Figure 3, but
with rounded corners to avoid otherwise large movements in output and real and nominal
interest rates. (The latter are essentially ﬁrst and second derivatives of inﬂa t i o ni n( 1 5 ) - ( 1 7 ) . )
The major news of Figure 10 is that output declines through the entire inﬂation episode.
This is stagﬂation, not a boom; a march of the Phillips curve up and to the right as in
the 1970s. The reason is transparent: The inﬂation is all expected; expected inﬂation rises
before actual inﬂation. The forward-looking Phillips curve  = +1 + implies lower
output; +1 is a “Phillips curve shift.”
Real interest rates decline in the stagﬂation, and rise again when output recovers. The
nominal rate is a simple sum of expected inﬂation and the real rate. (Again, the solution is
the same if we regard the nominal rate as the policy lever, debt sales as the instrument, and
inﬂation as the result.) Since the nominal rate falls with output growth and then rises in
the recovery, the overall rise in nominal rate is greater than the rise in inﬂation. An observer
m i g h tw e l lc o n c l u d et h a tt h eF e di sp r o p e r l yf o l l o w i n ga“ T a y l o rr u l e ”w i t hi n t e r e s tr a t e s
6With “active” ﬁscal policy of the form (3) we do not have to specify policy as a function of endogenous
variables in the form of a Taylor rule; the equilibrium is the same given the eventual value of the interest
rate whether that interest rate varies with oﬀ-equilibrium values of endogenous variables or not. An “active”
ﬁscal policy solves the global indeterminacy problems of New Keynesian models, see Cochrane (2007).























Figure 10: Output and real and nominal rates in a “delayed inﬂation” scenario. I assume
the path of inﬂation. Given that path, I calcuate output , the real rate  and the nominal
rate  respectively, using  = +1+;  = +1−;  = ++1 respectively.
Iu s e =0 98=1 ,  =1 . These expressions represent deviations from a steady state. I
plot  and  around steady-state values 1%2%,a n d3% respectively for clarity.
declining in the recession, rising faster than inﬂation, and rising with rising output growth.
Yet a mysterious inﬂation coming from “loss of anchoring” bedeviled its eﬀorts. In a sense,
that is exactly what happened.
Of course, there are many diﬀerent versions of the Phillips curve, with slightly diﬀerent
timing. But expected inﬂation is a “shift” in almost all of them, so this scenario, of a widely
anticipated inﬂation, is unlikely to give much of an output boom in any model.
In this scenario, the government delayed and smoothed inﬂation from a surplus shock
at time zero, accepting a larger eventual increase in the price level. This analysis points to
an apparent further cost of delay. A time-zero price level jump is unexpected, and could
be followed by a return to zero inﬂation; that path would lead to more output. However,
such a policy would also lead to an equal number of negative innovations, and more output
instability in general.
O n em a yr i g h t l yo b j e c tt h a tt h i ss i m p l em a r r i a g eo faﬁscal equation to a three equation
New-Keynesian model needs a lot more theoretical elaboration and empirical evaluation
before predicting anything. In particular, it’s hard with this simple Phillips curve to account
for the severity of the output drop in the recession. Yes, the recession is unexpected while
this scenario studies an expected inﬂation, but the 2008 decline in inﬂation is modest. A
view that people expected a quick return of inﬂation is unlikely. One needs either a diﬀerent
and more realistic Phillips curve, as is common in the empirical literature, or to add shocks.
35More deeply, we need to understand better the operation of this “active ﬁscal, passive money”
regime (using Leeper’s 1991 terminology) of models with explicit price-stickiness.










inﬂation can follow from issuing more money  or debt  (or long-term debt 
()
 ) without
changes in surpluses; from shocks to prospective deﬁcits +,c a u s i n gaﬂight from debt, or
from a rise in the risk premium +. It’s not at all obvious that each of these changes
is accompanied by a boom or by the same boom. We have some sense that unexpectedly
printing up a lot of money — a ﬁscal helicopter drop — might give a short-term output boost,
especially if it were done as a surprise. However, the experience of ﬁscal inﬂations caused by
current and prospective deﬁcits — currency collapses — is not comforting.
Standard views
Here I part company with most of the inﬂation/deﬂation commentators and the Federal
Reserve. All of them link inﬂation tightly to increased “demand” and hence tighter markets.
In a revealing statement, Chairman Bernanke (2009b) said to Congress,
Even after a recovery gets under way, the rate of growth of real economic
activity is likely to remain below its longer-run potential for a while, implying
that the current slack in resource utilization will increase further. ...In this en-
vironment, we anticipate that inﬂation will remain low. The slack in resource
utilization remains sizable, and, notwithstanding recent increases in the prices
of oil and other commodities, cost pressures generally remain subdued. As a
consequence, inﬂation is likely to move down some over the next year relative to
its pace in 2008. That said, improving economic conditions and stable inﬂation
expectations should limit further declines in inﬂation.
Throughout 2009 and 2010 the FOMC has been issuing nearly identical statements. This
one is from March 16 2010:
“With substantial resource slack continuing to restrain cost pressures and
longer-term inﬂation expectations stable, inﬂation is likely to be subdued for
some time.
The Committee ... continues to anticipate that economic conditions, includ-
ing low rates of resource utilization, subdued inﬂa t i o nt r e n d s ,a n ds t a b l ei n ﬂation
expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds
r a t ef o ra ne x t e n d e dp e r i o d . ”
So, inﬂation is caused by “tightness” (the opposite of “slack”) in the economy. This is
not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given “slack” we apparently
36don’t have to worry about inﬂation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlations
of Figures 8 and 9
These statements do mention “stable inﬂation expectations.” How does the Fed know
expectations are “stable” and won’t come unglued once people look at deﬁcit numbers? As
I read Fed statements, almost all conﬁdence in “stable” or “anchored” expectations comes
from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inﬂation (adaptive expecta-
tions). To a lesser extent, the Fed relies on survey data and interest rate data. For example,
Chairman Bernanke (2010b) asserted again in his February 24 2010 testimony that “accord-
ing to most measures, longer-term inﬂation expectations have remained relatively stable.”
The accompanying semiannual report on monetary policy (Federal Reserve 2010) mentions
inﬂation expectations three times. The ﬁrst asserts that “inﬂation expectations have been
relatively stable” and points to a graph (ﬁgure 2) of actual inﬂation. The second (under
“prices”) summarizes median survey data, excusing a jump in short-term expectations by
energy prices and pointing to more stable long-term expectations. The third inferred expec-
tations from Treasury vs. TIP yields, again arguing that “short-term” expectations might
have risen but “long-term” expectations had not changed much. These are the only mention
of expectations or documentation of the FOMC and Chairman’s assertions in the document.
Occasionally, sophisticated Fed statements allude to the New-Keynesian idea that expecta-
tions are anchored by a belief that the Fed will respond quickly to inﬂation, though not
why people should have such a belief. The volume of popular press coverage of deﬁcits and
inﬂation — clearly about expected future inﬂation — and even the ads for gold on cable TV
suggest at least a more widespread concern about inﬂation than has been present for some
time.
In particular, Fed statements make no mention of ﬁscal constraints on monetary policy,
the possibility that ﬁscal inﬂation can erupt and there is little the Fed can do about it, or
that uncontrolled deﬁcits may quickly induce higher inﬂation expectations. Two exceptions
suggest the rule: One of the few recent Fed statements on our ﬁscal position is this, from
Chairman Bernanke’s (2009c) July 21 2009 testimony:
..maintaining the conﬁdence of the public and ﬁnancial markets requires that
policymakers begin planning now for the restoration of ﬁscal balance. Prompt
attention to questions of ﬁscal sustainability is particularly critical because of
the coming budgetary and economic challenges associated with the retirement
of the baby-boom generation and continued increases in the costs of Medicare
and Medicaid. Addressing the country’s ﬁscal problems will require diﬃcult
choices, but postponing those choices will only make them more diﬃcult. More-
over, agreeing on a sustainable long-run ﬁscal path now could yield considerable
near-term economic beneﬁts in the form of lower long-term interest rates and
increased consumer and business conﬁdence. Unless we demonstrate a strong
commitment to ﬁscal sustainability, we risk having neither ﬁnancial stability nor
durable economic growth.
Though warning against deﬁcits, the main danger Chairman Bernanke sees from an
unsustainable debt path is higher long-term interest rates, presumably from a ﬂow crowding
37out argument, and less “conﬁdence.”
Addressing the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform on April 27,
2010, (Bernanke 2010c) he went further,
Increasing levels of government debt relative to the size of the economy can
lead to higher interest rates, which inhibit capital formation and productivity
g r o w t h — a n dm i g h te v e np u tt h ec u r r e n te c o n o m i cr e c o v e r ya tr i s k .T ot h ee x t e n t
that higher debt increases our reliance on foreign borrowing, an ever-larger share
of our future income would be devoted to interest payments on federal debt
held abroad. Moreover, other things being equal, increased federal debt implies
higher taxes in the future to cover the associated interest costs—higher taxes that
may create disincentives to work, save, hire, and invest. High levels of debt also
decrease the ability of policymakers to respond to future economic and ﬁnancial
shocks; indeed, a loss of investor conﬁdence in the ability of a government to
achieve ﬁscal sustainability can itself be a source of signiﬁcant economic and
ﬁnancial instability, as we have seen in a number of countries in recent decades.
These are all important points, but only the last sentence begins to give a glimmer of the
ﬁscal equation’s warning — that when investors question ﬁscal sustainability, inﬂation can
break out despite ample “slack” and there is nothing the Fed can do about it.
Other commentators on both sides evoke similar views. Krugman (2009) writes “[in
ordinary times]...banks, ﬂush with reserves, would increase loans, which would drive up
demand, which would push up prices.” Laﬀer (2009) describes the same mechanism. Feldstein
(2009) describes a more general “demand” based mechanism: “The key fact is that inﬂation
rises when demand exceeds supply. A ﬁscal deﬁcit raises demand when the government
increases its purchase of goods and services or, by lowering taxes, induces households to
increase their spending...” Again, he’s worried about crowding out, not a ﬂight from the
debt and stagﬂation.
All of these analyses ignore the stagﬂation experience of the 1970s, in which inﬂation was
high even with “slack” markets and little “demand,” and “expectations” moved quickly.
They ignore the experience of hyperinﬂations and currency collapses, which happen in
economies well below “potential.” The Phillips curve does shift, and a ﬁscal inﬂation may
well correspond to a shift, not a movement along that curve, and there may be very little
the central bank can do about it.
7C o n c l u s i o n









is at the center of macroeconomic events right now, from understanding the recession, to
stimulus, to monetary policy, to the inﬂation/deﬂation debate, to the future of the Euro.
38Will we get inﬂation? The scenario leading to inﬂa t i o ns t a r t sw i t hp o o rg r o w t h ,p o s s i -
bly reinforced by to larger government distortions, higher tax rates, and policy uncertainty.
Lower growth is the single most important negative inﬂuence on the Federal budget. Then,
the government may have to make good on its many credit guarantees. A wave of sov-
ereign (Greece), semi-sovreign (California) and private (pension funds, mortgages) bailouts
may pave the way. A failure to resolve entitlement programs that everyone sees lead to
unsustainable deﬁcits will not help.
When investors see that path coming, they will quite suddenly try to sell government
debt and dollar-denominated debt. We will see a rise in interest rates, reﬂecting expected
inﬂation and a higher risk premium for U.S. government debt. The higher risk premium
will exacerbate the inﬂationary decline in demand for U.S. debt. A substantial inﬂation
will follow — and likely a “stagﬂation” not inﬂation associated with a boom. The interest
rate rise and inﬂation can come long before the worst of the deﬁcits and any monetization
materialize. As with all forward-looking economics, no obvious piece of news will trigger
these events. Oﬃcials may rail at “markets” and “speculators.” Economists and the Fed
may scratch their heads at the sudden “loss of anchoring” or “Phillips curve shift.”
This is a scenario, not a forecast. Whether it happens depends on the actions of our
public oﬃcials, which are very hard to forecast.
In the meantime, as I have outlined, the intellectual landscape for the analysis of monetary
and ﬁscal policy is changed deeply by a world in which ﬁscal issues crystallized in (18) exert
stronger inﬂuence on the advanced economies than they have for generations.
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